Vansh Manuja
Introduction
Gig workers, a significant part of Indias current economy with the growing popularity of quick commerce platforms are often neglected by the corporate house as well as the legislative. With around 77 lakh (7.7 million) workers were engaged in the gig economy in 2021 expected to expand to 2.35 crore (23.5 million) workers by 2029-30. Such a huge workforce calls for some rights as well as recognition in the legislative framework but their demands are often neglected and states barely take cognizance of such a huge work force with only 1 state with a functional act (The Rajasthan Platform Based Gig Workers (Registration and Welfare) Act, 2023) (‘Rajasthan Act’), and 2 states with passed bills namely Telangana Gig and Platform Workers (Registration, Social Security and Welfare) Bill, 2025 (‘Telangana Bill’), and The Karnataka Platform Based Gig Workers (Social Security And Welfare) Bill, 2025 (‘the Bill’).
This blog analyses the Karnataka Platform Based Gig Workers Bill, 2025 to demonstrate how, despite its regulatory advances, it fails to establish a minimum wage floor for gig workers. Drawing on the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom’s (‘UKSC’) caseUber BV and others (Appellants) v Aslam and others (Respondents) (‘Uber v. Aslam’), with primary focus on the examining minimum wage protections in platform work, which even the new labour codes fail to recognise, and critiques the continued classification of gig workers as independent contractors. It concludes by proposing statutory provision that can potentially address income insecurity.
The Karnataka Platform Based Gig Workers Bill, 2025
The Bill calls for several reforms such as the creation of “Gig Workers Welfare Board” (‘the Board’), specifies the rights of the gig workers, gig workers must be mandatorily registered and issued a unique ID, be entitled to social security benefits linked to contributions and work volume, and have access to a statutory grievance redressal mechanism. The Bill also requires aggregators and platforms to submit details of all onboarded gig workers to the Board as well as requires the platforms to register themselves.
It also includes provisions for clarity in the contracts so that the workers are aware what is controlling their cuts and incentives, the contract must spell out clear terms on pay rates, deductions and incentives. Crucially, contracts must acknowledge a worker’s right to refuse tasks offered by the platform. This means a delivery rider or driver cannot be penalized simply for declining a job. Any change to contract terms or deactivation must be preceded by a 14-day notice and valid reasons in writing. Platforms are also required to explain to workers how automated systems influence work allocation, earnings, and performance ratings. Accompanied by a provision that mandates platforms to respond to any worker’s query about such systems within five working days. The law also creates a Gig Workers’ Welfare Fund.
The Bill creates a distinction in a few positive ways when compared to the Rajasthan Act, and Telangana Bill, by giving the gig workers liberty to refuse tasks the bill sets aside a few rights fundamental to gig workers which the other two fail to do, the other thing it does better is detailed termination protocols which essentially protects the gig workers from wrongful termination as this provision asks for valid and reasonable cause for termination in writing by the aggregators.
What The Bill Fails to do in Light of Uber BV v. Aslam
The Bill has several shortcomings but this blog restricts itself to the issue pertaining to the lack of a minimum wage floor. The Bill does not mandate a minimum wage or earnings guarantee for gig workers. It doesn’t contain any provisions for compensation for waiting or idle time, which can be substantial in ride-hailing or delivery work. Section 13’s provisions on working conditions are vague “as far as reasonably practicable” and stop short of ensuring any minimum pay. Thus, a worker who waits for hours for a booking is uncompensated, and may still earn nothing if no jobs arrive, notwithstanding the fact that such waiting time is economically necessary and entirely dictated by the platform’s operational design.
UKSC rectifies a similar issue to a great extent in Uber v. Aslam, the UKSC unanimously held that Uber’s drivers were not independent contractors, but fell within the United Kingdom’s intermediate category of workers. This category entitles individuals to key protections: most importantly the National Minimum Wage and paid holiday leave although not all rights given to full employees but instead an intermediate level between independent contractors and employees. The effect was that Uber had to pay drivers at least National Minimum Wage for all the time they worked which the Court defined as any time during which a driver (a) had the Uber app switched on, (b) was within the authorised territory, and (c) was ready and willing to accept trips. (page 37-38)
Uber had structured contracts claiming that drivers were self-employed: it argued that drivers had freedom to work whenever they liked, and that Uber merely provided a booking platform. The Court rejected these labels. It looked at the economic reality (page 33) of the relationship, not the written agreement. The judgment emphasized the purpose of worker-protection laws: to safeguard vulnerable individuals with little or no say over their pay and working conditions who are subordinate to those who control their work a situation where interests of those who are able to construct the contract prevail over the interests of those who cannot.
“The reason why employees are thought to need such protection is that they are in a subordinate and dependent position vis-à-vis their employers: the purpose of the Regulations is to extend protection to workers who are, substantively and economically, in the same position. Thus the essence of the intended distinction must be between, on the one hand, workers whose degree of dependence is essentially the same as that of employees and, on the other, contractors who have a sufficiently arm’s-length and independent position to be treated as being able to look after themselves in the relevant respects.” (page 20)
The Court observed that Uber exercised significant control over the drivers who were per se individual contractors but were controlled by the Uber, it set the fares and commission rates, dictated nearly all contractual terms, and even controlled how drivers could interact with passengers (page 29). When a driver logs into the Uber app, Uber restricts which rides they can accept and penalizes frequent refusal through lower customer ratings or even deactivation. The Court agreed with the employment tribunal that drivers’ income was fixed by Uber and drivers had “no realistic opportunity of improving by their own efforts or entrepreneurial skill”. In sum, Uber’s actual relationship with drivers showed they were in a subordinate, dependent position akin to employees fitting the statutory definition of workers. This approach effectively led to invalidation of Uber’s attempt to contract out of labour standards through carefully worded agreements.
Although Uber v. Aslam arises from a different statutory context, its emphasis on economic reality aligns closely with Indian labour jurisprudence, particularly the Indian Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hussainbhai v. Alath Factory Thozhilali Union, the Court held that where the aggregator exercises ultimate economic control over the worker (independent contractor), work, and benefits from the labour, it cannot evade responsibility by framing contractual arrangements or denying formal employment status. The Supreme Court of India recognising that law should ideally protect workers who are dependent on the aggregator despite being labelled independent. Applying similar reasoning, platform-based gig workers warrant income protection. The Bill’s silence on a minimum wage floor makes it inconsistent with settled Indian labour law principles, and despite the magnitude of this issue and concerns of labour exploitation associated with it, it continues to be largely ignored.
Way Forward
Karnataka’s gig-worker law modernizes many aspects of gig work, such as, registration, benefits, grievance redressal and even concerns associated with transparency. But it leaves the one protection that defines worker welfare in the real economy, a minimum wage guarantee for the amount of work they’re doing, which is essential for ensuring dignified conditions of work for the gig workers. As the Uber v. Aslam observes, labeling cannot sideline economic reality and the relationship of their contract. For India’s gig workforce to progress ahead, legislation must figure out, who truly controls the work, and ensure the creation of a framework and ensuring a fair wage floor as well as its maintenance. It’s high time the legislative took cognizance of this issue and introduce a national legislature for the protection of gig workers and initiation of a system similar to the one in the United Kingdom. With the recognition for gig workers as “workers” instead of “independent contractors”, with provisions for their protection and welfare
Vansh Manuja is first year student of B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) at Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab.
NUALS Law Journal 