Ritwik Sharma
I. Introduction
The evidence of the correct date of birth holds paramount importance in service matters pertaining to employment in government institutions, where an individual’s age serves as a decisive factor in determining eligibility for employment or for specific benefits such as compassionate employment, compensation, gratuity, etc. In India, the matriculation certificate is ordinarily recognized as conclusive proof of an individual’s date of birth for employment records. However, in instances where there is evidence against the veracity of the date of birth mentioned in a documentary proof of age such as the matriculation certificate, there seems to be scope for the acceptance of other records as the definitive proof of age.
In this article, the author explores whether there is a legal basis in India for the matriculation certificate to be superseded by other records as the definitive document for establishing age in employment-related matters. The piece advocates for the consideration of service records as a stronger proof of evidence if the inaccuracy in the date of birth mentioned in the matriculation certificate can be reasonably established.
II. Conventional Supremacy of Matriculation Certificates
Courts have frequently relied on the matriculation certificates as a conclusive proof of evidence by accepting the date of birth mentioned therein to be authentic. While in cases of criminal nature involving the Juvenile Justice Act or in the absence of a matriculation certificate, other forms of evidence such as medical examinations have been accepted, matriculation certificates are considered to have greater evidentiary value in determining the age of an individual compared to other documents such as the birth certificate or the Aadhaar Card in service matters. Recently, the Rajasthan High Court in Jagdish Prasad v. Arvind Kumar held that a matriculation certificate has a greater evidentiary value than school admission forms for the determining the date of birth.
The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rishipal Singh Solanki v. The State Of Uttar Pradesh (“Rishipal Singh”), reasoning that a matriculation certificate, being a ‘public document’ under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, carries greater credibility than school admission forms. However, this rationale falters when reliable alternative evidence casts doubt on the accuracy of the date of birth recorded in such a certificate. The following sections examine service matters wherein alternative records have been presented as proof of age.
III. The Judicial Position on Service Records as a Determinant of Age
It is rare for Courts to question the authenticity of information such as the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate since an individual is bound for life by such details. However, the legal position on the primary evidence for determining the date of birth is unsettled when employment in government institutions is challenged based on an allegedly forged matriculation certificate, supported by contradictory evidence, such as the parent’s service records.
A. Alternative Dates of Birth Mentioned in Service Records of Parents
The above situation arose in the recent case of General Manager v. Smt. Taluka Devi (“Taluka Devi”) wherein the petitioner applied appointment on compassionate grounds under a scheme with an age limit of 35 years, relying on the matriculation certificate. The respondent rejected the application, citing personal data forms filled by the petitioner’s late father, showing that his age exceeded 35. The Jharkhand High Court upheld the lower court’s decision favouring the applicant. However, in this case, the High Court could not have independently assessed the veracity of the date in the matriculation certificate despite the existence of service documents showing contrary date of birth. Doing so is outside the scope of a High Court’s appellate power, since it cannot come to an alternative finding of facts by re-assessing evidence presented in the lower court.
Notably, the Jharkhand High Court recognized that in the absence or non-availability of the matriculation certificate, the date of birth can be assessed by conducting a medical examination. From this position, it can be inferred that if a matriculation certificate is present but is of dubious veracity, it should be considered to be unavailable, and hence other records such as medical examination or service records should be favoured.
B. Express Denial of Recognition of Service Records as Contrary Evidence
However, a contrary position had been taken previously by the Jharkhand High Court in Kamta Pandey v. B.C.C.L. (“Kamta Pandey”) by holding that in case of a dispute, “no other record, including service records” can surpass the matriculation certificate in determining the date of birth. While the Court’s rationale for such position was that the matriculation certificate is issued by a statutory institution created by the State, this rationale fails to justify the situation where the date of the birth mentioned in the matriculation certificate is itself of doubtful veracity and the concerned statutory institution has failed to verify it. There is hence a legal gap in existing precedents which warrants greater clarity.
The primary issue in Kamta Pandey raises a substantial question of law, i.e., whether the conclusive proof of age for service matters should only be determined by the date of birth recorded in an authenticated matriculation certificate, or if other relevant documents containing the date of birth such as service records also have equal evidentiary value. The Court’s ruling in favour of giving precedence to the matriculation certificate was in light of the facts and circumstances of this case and do not act as a precedent, since Kamta Pandey did not involve a dispute on the veracity of the matriculation certificate. The legal concern that still stands is what the conclusive proof of age should be in situations wherein the veracity of the date of birth mentioned in the matriculation certificate is questionable, owing to service records that show contrary evidence.
IV. Can Other Equally Relevant Documents Supersede the Matriculation Certificate?
While it is a settled principle of law that the matriculation certificate is a strong evidence for determining age, the Supreme Court in Rishipal Singh clarified that any document of public nature, such as the matriculation certificate, is acceptable by Courts “provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., Section 35.” This caveat strengthens the contention that the presence of sufficient evidence to prove the inauthenticity of the date of birth in a matriculation certificate allows other reliable public records to be admissible with significant evidentiary value.
Similarly, in Parag Bhati v. State of U.P., the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the conclusive nature of the date of birth recorded in a matriculation certificate is dependent on both its availability, and when “there is no other material to prove the correctness of date of birth.” This implies that where such material exists, it may override the certificate in proving the correct of the date of birth. Likewise, in Manoj Kumar v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, the Supreme Court held that “other equally relevant material cannot be ignored, particularly when the matriculate certificate has been corrected.” Thus, other credible evidence can supersede the certificate if its accuracy is questionable.
Instances involving an easily disputable date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate are not uncommon. The Supreme Court in Ishwarlal Mohanlal Thakkar v. Paschim Gujarat Vij Company rejected the school leaving certificate as evidence for determining the date of birth. The Court accepted the contention that the veracity of the date mentioned in the certificate was dubious as the date mentioned therein was practically impossible since it would indicate that there was a mere five-months’ difference between the appellant’s birth and that of his elder sibling. Therefore, if substantial contrary evidence exists in other records, the matriculation certificate must not be considered a conclusive proof of evidence.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court in Union of India v. C. Rama Swamy has recognized that when a candidate communicates a particular date of birth at the first instance, it reflects their intention for their age to be calculated on the basis of that date of birth. If credible, alternative documents such as a parent’s service records in the same institution indicate a more likely alternate date of birth, then the principle of the presumption of the matriculation certificate as the conclusive proof of date of birth should ease to operate.
However, while producing a false certificate for employment is a grave misconduct that justifies dismissal of service, a mere discrepancy in the case where only the authenticity of the date of birth mentioned in such a certificate is questionable, no such punishment should be imposed even if other documentary records make it evident that the date in the matriculation certificate is likely incorrect. In such a case, it is not possible to prove that such a discrepancy is a deliberate attempt to gain advantage by misrepresenting a date of birth different from that in other official records. Nevertheless, since it would be against public policy to permit such a person to benefit from a younger age as per the matriculation certificate, more credible alternative records should be used to determine the age.
This legal position is not only desirable but also feasible. The Supreme Court has held the standard of proof in civil cases to be based on a “preponderance of probability” rather than “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi. Thus, if a more plausible alternative date can be reasonably inferred from other reliable records or factual and circumstantial evidence, their evidentiary value should be considered equally alongside the matriculation certificate.
Ritwik Sharma is a third-year law student at the Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Patiala.
NUALS Law Journal 