Koushiik Kumar
Introduction
The expansion of digital legal databases has transformed judicial records into globally accessible repositories. This development, while democratising access, has also raised sharp questions of privacy. In Karthick Theodore v. Registrar General (2024), the Madras High Court directed Indian Kanoon to remove a judgment revealing the petitioner’s name and intimate details, despite his acquittal more than a decade earlier. The court invoked Article 21’s privacy guarantee and the emerging “right to be forgotten” (“RTBF”), holding that continued online availability served no public interest.
This paper argues that Karthick Theodore reflects an emergent regional jurisprudence that re-anchors privacy within the open justice framework. The decision is significant because it goes beyond victim anonymity to recognise that acquitted accused may also seek redaction of judgments. At the same time, it exposes doctrinal uncertainties. High Courts across India have adopted divergent approaches to RTBF claims, ranging from expansive privacy protection to categorical rejection. Without clear guidance, the balance between privacy and transparency risks fragmenting.
The paper proceeds in six parts. The first sketches the background of judicial records in the digital age and the place of RTBF in Indian constitutional law. The second analyses the Madras High Court’s reasoning in Karthick Theodore. The third offers a doctrinal critique, highlighting the court’s use of proportionality but also its ambiguities. The fourth situates the ruling against other High Court decisions, showing the lack of a uniform standard. The fifth examines the policy and empirical consequences for open access platforms like IndianKanoon. The sixth proposes a framework for harmonising privacy with transparency, before concluding.
Judicial Records and the RTBF in India
Traditionally, judgments were “public records,” accessible only through court libraries or official reporters. The rise of online platforms such as Indian Kanoon has made judgments searchable by name, ensuring near-permanent visibility. This shift intensifies reputational harms. An acquitted person may nonetheless remain digitally marked, as courts themselves noted in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), where Justice Nariman observed that “what is forgotten by human memory is retained indefinitely on the internet”
The RTBF has gained statutory foothold in the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023. Section 12(3) empowers data principals to seek erasure of personal data once its purpose lapses, unless retention is necessary for legal obligations. Although courts are not directly bound, the DPDP framework strengthens claims to informational self-determination.
Judicial responses have been mixed. For instance, the Gujarat High Court in Dharamraj Dave v. State of Gujarat (2015) denied removal of an acquittal judgment, reasoning that judgments are inherently public. The Kerala High Court in Vysakh K.G. v. Union of India (2022) similarly rejected RTBF claims. Conversely, the Delhi High Court in Jorawar Singh Mundy v. Union of India (2021) and ABC v. State (2024) directed masking of names of acquitted individuals. Karthick Theodore enters this contested terrain.
The Madras High Court’s Reasoning
The petitioner, acquitted in 2011, alleged that continued online access to the judgment obstructed his professional and personal life, including denial of a visa. A single judge refused relief, but the Division Bench overturned this.
The Bench grounded its reasoning in three strands. First, it relied on the right to privacy under Article 21. Citing Puttaswamy, the court affirmed that privacy includes control over the dissemination of personal data. It emphasised the DPDP Act’s erasure right as indicative of legislative policy. Second, it examined open justice under Article 145(4) of the Constitution and Section 327 of the CrPC. Transparency was recognised as the “general rule,” fortified by Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court (2018), which authorised live-streaming. Third, the court insisted on a balancing test. It held that neither value is absolute, and once acquittal is final, “no public interest is served” by retaining personal identifiers. Redaction preserves the judgment’s ratio while protecting dignity.
On relief, the Bench ordered publication of a redacted version omitting names, preservation of the unredacted judgment in court archives, and deletion of the unredacted version from Indian Kanoon and other online databases. This approach, the court stressed, did not “alter the sanctity of the judicial record” but moderated its public reflection.
Doctrinal Critique
The decision demonstrates important strengths. It integrates proportionality reasoning: privacy harms are assessed against the residual public interest in disclosure. It draws from statutory policy, using the DPDP Act to reinforce constitutional analysis. It also innovatively treats courts as data fiduciaries, obliged to consider downstream dissemination.
However, the ruling leaves gaps. The first concerns the scope of beneficiaries. While the petitioner was acquitted, the judgment’s language suggests broader applicability. Would convicted persons, after sentence completion, also qualify? The court does not clarify. The second gap lies in criteria for redaction. The Bench invoked “no public interest,” but offered little guidance on how to measure it. Should seriousness of offence, public office, or time elapsed matter? Without standards, discretion risks inconsistency. A third ambiguity arises in relation to authority over third-party databases. The directive to Indian Kanoon presumes courts can compel de-indexing. But unlike search engines in Google Spain v. AEPD (CJEU 2014), Indian Kanoon republishes official records. The doctrinal basis for such an order remains contestable, especially since R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) held that publishing court records does not violate privacy. Normatively attractive though the ruling may be, its legal architecture is fragile.
Comparative High Court Jurisprudence
Comparisons with other High Courts sharpen the divergence. The Delhi High Court in ABC v. State (2024) ordered the removal of an acquittal judgment, echoing Karthick Theodore. Earlier, in Jorawar Singh Mundy (2021), the court required Indian Kanoon to mask the petitioner’s name. Delhi has thus developed a consistent pro-privacy stance. In contrast, the Kerala High Court in Vysakh K.G. (2022) rejected RTBF claims, stressing that judgments must remain intact as public documents. The Gujarat High Court in Dharamraj Dave(2015) similarly refused redaction, reasoning that acquittal judgments still serve public purposes, including precedent. The Karnataka High Court inV. v. Registrar General(2017) allowed masking of a minor’s name but insisted the judgment itself remain online. The result is a fractured jurisprudence, considering that the Delhi and Madras High Courts foreground privacy, while Kerala and Gujarat prioritise transparency. Without Supreme Court guidance on clear criteria in approaching the RTBF, litigants practically face a jurisdictional lottery.
Policy and Empirical Consequences
For open access platforms, Karthick Theodore is disruptive. Indian Kanoon hosts over 1.4 million judgments and attracts hundreds of thousands of users monthly. Its free model depends on comprehensive indexing. Systematic redaction orders may fragment databases, hinder legal research, and reduce accountability. Scholars and journalists rely on such archives for transparency. At the same time, privacy harms are tangible. Reports and qualitative accounts suggest that acquittals do not always erase suspicion, since online judgments allow employers, landlords, and even consular authorities to access allegations long after proceedings are closed. In India, where background checks and visa procedures often rely on digital searches rather than official certificates, the RTBF has direct stakes for livelihoods. The empirical tension is sharp: unqualified openness risks perpetuating stigma, while unqualified erasure undermines precedent and research.
Toward a Framework
A doctrinally coherent framework must satisfy three conditions. First, it must preserve the integrity of the legal record. Unredacted judgments should remain in court archives to maintain precedent and accountability. Second, it must permit surgical anonymisation. Upon acquittal or quashing, courts should allow redaction of personal identifiers in public versions, akin to Section 228A IPC’s protection of victim anonymity. Third, it must define clear criteria. Relief should depend on finality of proceedings, absence of overriding public interest such as systemic significance or public office, and demonstrable prejudice. Finally, intermediary obligations must be allocated carefully. Platforms like Indian Kanoon should not be compelled to erase judgments wholesale but to display redacted versions supplied by registries. This ensures consistency while respecting transparency. Such a framework harmonises Article 21 privacy with open justice, reflecting proportionality rather than absolutism.
Conclusion
Karthick Theodore marks a pivotal turn in Indian RTBF jurisprudence. By ordering redaction of judicial records and imposing duties on legal databases, the Madras High Court foregrounded privacy within the constitutional order. However, the ruling also illustrates doctrinal uncertainty, given that the scope of beneficiaries, standards for redaction, and authority over third-party platforms remain unsettled. Comparative High Court practice confirms the lack of uniformity. While Delhi and Madras protect acquitted persons, Kerala and Gujarat insist on transparency. This regional patchwork risks inconsistency and forum shopping.
The way forward lies in a principled framework, involving preserving official records while anonymising public versions; balancing demonstrable prejudice against residual public interest; and standardising intermediary obligations. Only such clarity can reconcile the dignity of individuals with the constitutional promise of open courts. Ultimately, the right to be forgotten in India should not erase law but should ensure that judicial archives do not become instruments of perpetual stigma. In recognising this, Karthick Theodore takes an important but incomplete step toward a balanced jurisprudence.
Koushiik Kumar is a third-year undergraduate student pursuing a B.B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) degree at NLS, Bengaluru, India
NUALS Law Journal 